Yves right here. Whereas very unhealthy outcomes appear to be baked in, with not simply the US however different governments looking at unhealthy market outcomes (France, the UK, Japan, Indonesia), weirdly there are some close to time period knowledge factors at odds with the notion {that a} greenback collapse is imminent. In 9/20/2025 Hyperlinks, one entry from Reuters is Overseas holdings of US Treasuries surge to all-time excessive in July, China’s sink.
course, markets are fickle and this publish works by the numerous pressures on the Treasury market and the greenback that would set off catastrophic outcomes. And Trump continues to be a harmful pressure.
By Dennis Snower, Senior Analysis Fellow Blavatnik College of Authorities, College of Oxford; Non-residential Senior Fellow Brookings Establishment; Founding President International Options Initiative; Visiting Professor, Institute for International Prosperity College Faculty London (UCL); Professorial Analysis Fellow, Institute of New Financial Considering and Visiting Professor, College Faculty Oxford College of Oxford. Initially printed at VoxEU
Lack of confidence within the US greenback’s reserve foreign money standing might set off a collapse of the US Treasury market and worldwide monetary fragmentation. This column argues that hedging is a rational response to latest fluctuations within the US greenback, as buyers look to insure towards alternate charge dangers. Nonetheless, widespread hedging itself makes Treasuries much less engaging, which additional weakens confidence. The Federal Reserve has a number of instruments to stabilise markets within the quick time period, together with offering time-limited liquidity, activating greenback swap traces, supporting non-bank money conduits, and lending to non-banks. These actions purchase time however will not be enough by themselves to revive long-term confidence.
Monetary markets have gotten conscious that President Trump’s insurance policies are undermining the greenback because the world’s reserve foreign money (Choi et al. 2024, Lachman 2025, Nagano and Kimura 2017, Subacchi and van den Noord 2025). That is vital not simply because the US enjoys an ‘exorbitant privilege’ – borrowing at low rates of interest, working persistently giant commerce deficits, printing cash to finance these deficits with out worry of inflation – that the US might lose (Gopinath et al. 2020). It’s also vital as a result of the lack of confidence within the greenback’s reserve foreign money standing makes hedging the rational response, each as safety towards greenback depreciation and as compliance with portfolio mandates of pension funds, insurers, and sovereign wealth funds. However widespread hedging itself can grow to be the set off of a monetary crash.
The Hazard
A monetary crash triggered by a lack of confidence within the US greenback because the world’s reserve foreign money would result in a collapse of the US Treasury market. Greater Treasury yields would increase US authorities borrowing prices, worsening fiscal sustainability considerations and feeding again into confidence loss. Reserve managers and personal buyers would diversify into gold, euro, yuan, and probably digital currencies. International commerce and overseas alternate settlement invoicing would shift towards euro, yuan, or regional currencies. Lengthy-standing community results of greenback dominance start to erode, making worldwide monetary transactions extra inefficient (Snower 2025).
Past that, the worldwide banking and monetary system would come below extreme stress. Banks’ steadiness sheets, closely invested in Treasuries and company securities, would endure mark-to-market losses, weakening Tier 1 capital. Runs on cash market funds might happen as redemptions spike, forcing fireplace gross sales of short-term US greenback property. Stablecoins, which maintain giant Treasury reserves, might face redemption runs, compounding pressured gross sales of T-bills.
The worldwide spillovers are predictable. The cross-currency foundation (reflecting the rate of interest differentials between the greenback and different currencies, adjusted for the price of changing from one to the opposite) would flip antagonistic, elevating the price of hedging US property. Rising markets would face tighter greenback funding, foreign money depreciation, and better borrowing prices, resulting in capital flight. Euro space, Japan, and China bond markets will not be giant sufficient to soak up huge reallocations, producing volatility and fragmentation throughout international markets (BIS 2022, Gopinath and Gourinchas 2023).
The macroeconomic penalties are additionally predictable. The US might now not borrow cheaply in its personal foreign money, forcing larger rates of interest, tighter fiscal coverage, and doable monetisation of debt, thereby risking inflation. The euro space and China would expertise short-term foreign money appreciation and monetary inflows, however stress resulting from restricted market depth and institutional capability to exchange US greenback secure property. The worldwide economic system would face larger transaction prices, alternate charge volatility, and weakened international monetary integration.
The systemic consequence is worldwide monetary fragmentation (Aiyar and Ilyina 2023). A multipolar financial system would emerge with no single dominant reserve foreign money. This is able to improve monetary volatility, weaken worldwide monetary coordination, and heighten the chance of regional blocs with competing monetary techniques. Political alliances would shift as nations realign reserves and funds techniques round options to the US greenback.
The alarming level is {that a} speculative assault on the greenback is pointless as catalyst; hedging in response to market pressures is sufficient. In fact, as soon as speculators realise that hypothesis isn’t obligatory for the greenback to fall, hypothesis towards the greenback turns into way more possible.
How the Greenback’s Reserve Forex Standing Is Undermined
It’s straightforward to see why every of the stipulations for the greenback’s reserve foreign money standing (Eichengreen 2011) are at the moment being undermined:
- A reserve foreign money requires macroeconomic stability (low inflation, sustainable public debt, and sound fiscal and financial coverage), however President Trump has pursued giant tax cuts with out offsetting spending restraint, resulting in speedy debt accumulation.
- The nation issuing a reserve foreign money should supply secure, extremely liquid property, significantly sovereign bonds, and buyers should belief the federal government to repay and handle the debt responsibly. Nonetheless, rising debt ranges and threats of default undercut such confidence.
- A reserve foreign money depends on a politically impartial central financial institution, dedicated to cost stability, primarily based on a clear rules-based financial coverage, however President Trump pressured the Federal Reserve publicly to chop rates of interest and considers putting in loyalists to key Fed positions.
- A reserve foreign money should be freely tradable and exchangeable throughout borders with minimal restrictions. Nonetheless, threats to dam Chinese language listings, penalise dollar-based cost techniques, or exclude adversaries from SWIFT have created a local weather of uncertainty round greenback entry. (Setser 2021).
- A reserve foreign money requires a authorized system that protects overseas buyers, enforces contracts, and supplies recourse in case of disputes. President Trump used government authority to sanction overseas companies, freeze central financial institution property (e.g. Iran, Venezuela), and imposed tariffs on allies. These actions undermined the sense that US monetary guidelines had been neutral.
- A reserve foreign money should be seen as a world public good, not a device of nationwide self-interest. However Trump’s coverage of ‘America First’, disengagement from multilateral establishments (Paris Accord, WHO, NATO), and the arbitrary imposition of excessive tariffs has signalled that the greenback is perhaps used strategically, not neutrally.
- The reserve foreign money issuer should be giant and influential in international commerce and finance, encouraging broad utilization. However nations like China, Russia, and Iran have elevated non-dollar commerce, and central banks have raised gold holdings and diversified overseas alternate reserves. 1
All these components assist clarify the latest fall within the worth of the US greenback relative to different main currencies. If buyers count on depreciation of the US greenback, hedging (by forwards and swaps) let buyers neutralise exchange-rate threat by fixing future conversion charges. If many buyers count on US greenback depreciation, hedging through these devices produces large-scale US greenback promoting stress.
As of mid-2025, international overseas buyers are estimated to carry roughly $14 trillion in unhedged US greenback property — that’s, investments in US dollar-denominated equities and stuck earnings that aren’t at the moment protected towards exchange-rate threat (RBC 2025). Even small, anticipated US greenback depreciations can cascade into widespread hedging as a result of a lot commerce and finance is invoiced in US {dollars}.
Pension funds, insurers, and sovereign wealth funds report returns of their dwelling foreign money. Because the chance of a weaker US greenback rises, fiduciary obligation and inside threat fashions require them to hedge extra systematically. Since euro, yen, Swiss, or CNY bond markets can’t absolutely soak up reserve flows, hedging is the ‘first line of defence’ for buyers who need safety with out dumping all US Treasuries. This makes hedging a pure and highly effective response to waning confidence.
Widespread hedging itself makes Treasuries much less engaging (through cross-currency foundation widening), which additional weakens confidence in greenback property. Thus, as soon as incentives to hedge emerge, they have an inclination to multiply.
Implications of Hedging
The implications could be summarized within the following steps:
Step 1: Mass hedging. A big wave of US dollar-selling-forwards makes the US greenback dearer to carry and hedge. That raises the efficient hedging value and subsequently lowers the foreign-exchange-hedged yield foreigners earn on US Treasuries.
Step 2: Collapse of returns on US Treasuries. As soon as hedged yields are unattractive relative to native options (Bunds, JGBs, Chinese language bonds, money, gold), marginal overseas demand for Treasuries weakens or reverses. Massive institutional managers (pension funds, insurers) function to focus on home-currency returns; when hedged returns fall, they need to rebalance out of Treasuries. Rebalancing generates precise promoting stress within the money Treasury market, not merely ahead exercise. Foreigners’ holdings are huge and concentrated; the obtainable different safe-asset capability (Bunds, JGBs, Swiss, China) is simply too small to soak up speedy giant flows.
Step 3: Liquidity stress within the US Treasury market. A big, concentrated promote wave causes sellers to extend margins, scale back quotes, and widen bid-ask spreads — creating market illiquidity. Because the March 2020 ‘dash-for-cash’ indicated, even very liquid Treasuries grew to become dysfunctional below stress.
Step 4: Fall within the worth of greenback property. A fall within the value of US Treasuries raises their yields (what buyers require to carry Treasuries). This reduces the market worth of different greenback property (mortgages, company credit score), and alerts that the greenback is weakening as a retailer of worth — prompting extra reserve diversification.
Step 5: Margin calls and compelled deleveraging. Leveraged gamers in derivatives and hedge funds face margin calls as greenback positions transfer towards them; they promote property (together with Treasuries) to fulfill necessities, amplifying value strikes. Many stablecoins maintain T-bills and quick Treasuries as reserves. A stablecoin run (pressured redemptions) can produce actual Treasury promote stress at a velocity and scale that conventional intermediaries can’t soak up, deepening illiquidity.
Step 6: Lack of other absorptive safe-asset capability. Euro, yen, Swiss, and Chinese language bond markets are too small, not absolutely open, or not sufficiently trusted to be fast substitutes. That lack of a backstop amplifies the disorderly adjustment.
Step 7: Hazard of greenback crash. A big rise in US Treasury yields along with liquidity dysfunction implies that the worldwide provide of dollar-denominated secure property now not appears to be like as secure or liquid as earlier than. Reserve managers subsequently scale back greenback share of reserves, improve gold, euro, yuan, SDR or different holdings, and use overseas alternate interventions and gross sales of {dollars}. Fast and visual reserve shifts are interpreted by markets as a long-run structural train in de-dollarisation, resulting in additional promoting of greenback property.
Step 8: Stress on the US banking system. The stress arises from three sources. First, US banks maintain giant portions of Treasuries and company mortgage-backed securities. Sharp mark-to-market losses on Treasuries scale back banks’ e book fairness and regulatory capital ratios if losses are realised or if accounting and regulatory guidelines transfer unrealised losses by capital. Second, banks use Treasuries as collateral in repo and are counterparties in swap markets. A liquidity crunch can create margin calls and funding squeezes. If Treasuries can’t be rehypothecated at anticipated haircuts, banks might face funding shortfalls. Retail depositors might panic in the event that they understand financial institution solvency deterioration, resulting in deposit outflows. Lastly, banks’ exposures to sellers, cash market funds, and shadow-bank entities imply stress in a single sector propagates rapidly. Total, a run on Treasuries can provoke financial institution stress, significantly for banks that can’t depend on central-bank backstops, have giant unhedged interest-rate exposures, or are pressured to understand losses.
A vital level is that such a disaster doesn’t require a speculative assault towards the greenback or a macroeconomic collapse within the US — solely a shift in market expectations and a big mechanical move (hedging) that stresses market plumbing. Markets are reflexive: liquidity and hedging prices matter at the least as a lot as fundamentals. As a result of a lot international finance is run to focus on hedged home-currency returns, a hedging shock is mechanically in a position to reprice, displace marginal demand, and create a run dynamic.
The Fed has a toolkit (utilized in 2008 and in March 2020) to revive liquidity and calm markets rapidly. First, it could present giant, time-limited liquidity to Treasury markets (major market and repo market). It could possibly interact in open-market purchases (shopping for Treasuries outright into the System Open Market Account (SOMA)) to soak up promoting stress and restore a functioning bid. It could possibly supply in a single day and time period repos towards Treasuries to major sellers and different counterparties to allow them to warehouse Treasuries with out being pressured sellers. It could possibly lend to major sellers towards Treasuries as collateral by the Main Seller Credit score Facility (PDCF).
Second, it could activate greenback swap traces with different central banks to provide {dollars} overseas and scale back pressures that feed again into US Treasury promoting. It could possibly use foreign money swaps and overseas repo to assist stabilise the worldwide greenback funding market and restrict cross-border pass-through.
Third, the Fed can help non-bank money conduits and cash market funds (MMFs). Particularly, the Cash Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (MMLF) permits banks to borrow towards securities purchased from MMFs, stopping pressured gross sales and runs. The Business Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) and comparable amenities can backstop business paper and short-term funding markets.
Lastly, with Treasury approval, the Fed can lend broadly to nonbanks and create particular programmes (as in 2020) to help credit score markets, together with shopping for sure asset varieties. That is legally and politically constrained however possible. The Treasury can use money administration (difficulty payments, supply to purchase again or difficulty new maturities) to help market functioning.
All these actions purchase time, restore market functioning, and stop a disorderly value collapse by offering counterparties with liquidity and absorption capability.
Nonetheless, giant, extended Fed purchases (or an ‘limitless QE’ promise) threat being interpreted as debt monetisation, undermining long-term confidence within the greenback as a retailer of worth. That would speed up reserve diversification — the precise reverse of the meant impact. Even momentary interventions might not restore overseas buyers’ willingness to carry hedged Treasuries if overseas exchange-hedged returns stay unattractive relative to dwelling options. Thus, interventions can stabilise markets within the quick time period with out stopping a longer-term shift in reserve preferences.
As a result of markets are reflexive, a threat that originates in in any other case prudent portfolio insurance coverage (hedging) can grow to be the very mechanism that destroys the asset being insured. The shortage of credible different secure property, the mechanics of the overseas exchange-swap market and foundation, and the amplification through stablecoins and leverage imply that hedging alone — if carried out concurrently and at scale — is a reputable pathway to each a Treasury market crash and a broader lack of confidence within the greenback.
A sudden lack of confidence within the greenback as reserve foreign money wouldn’t solely destabilise US Treasuries and the greenback itself, but additionally propagate by banks, cash markets, stablecoins, and international commerce invoicing. The result’s systemic monetary fragmentation, larger international volatility, and a restructuring of the worldwide financial system. On this fragmented world, nations grow to be much less depending on each other economically and thus extra liable to political confrontations.
See unique publish for references


































